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ECONOMISTS and other analysts seek to measure
expectations of future interest rates because such ex-
pectations have important effects on economic behav-
ior, Changes in expectations can lead to changes in
economic activity, both at the level of the individual
firm or consumer, and at the level of the national
economy. For example, interest rate expectations
enter into investment decisions of firms, porffolio de-
cisions of financial intermediaries and other investors,
and borrowing decisions of state and local govern-
ments. If these groups alter their expectations of the
future level of interest rates, changes in investment,
portfolio, and borrowing decisions will occur which
affect not only each group individually, but which
also affect the level of economic activity in the econ-
omy as a whole. Consequently, policymakers and
researchers have been interested in measuring market
expectations of interest rates — first, to understand
the behavior of economic units in individual markets,
and second, to monitor changes in expectations which
result from policy actions, in order to judge the im-
pact which the policy may have on the economy.
For example, consider the discussion surrounding
the recently aborted Federal income tax rebate. The
argument for such a policy was that it would stimu-
late consumer spending, and thus stimulate aggre-
gate output and employment. However, there was
considerable concern that the policy would cause an
upward revision of short-term interest rate expecta-
tions if there were general agreement that the Treas-
urv would have to increase its borrowing substantially
during the second half of 1977 to finance the in-
creased deficit. Under such circumstances, much, if
not all, of the alleged stimulus that would be pro-
vided by the tax rebate could be offset by the negative
impact of higher interest rate expectations on firms’
decisions to invest in real capital. Such a negative
effect arises because the higher the expected level of
future interest rates, the less profitable the income
stream associated with each particular investment
project. The examination of such effects of policy
~The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Ms.
Jeanne Rickey and the Statistical Department of the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange for providing data used iu this paper.
actions would he made much easier if market expec-
tations of future interest rates were readily observable.
A considerable amount of economic research has
been devoted to formulating measures of market ex-
pectations of interest rates, since data on expectations
are not directly observable unless survey methods are
used. Efforts at measurement have taken the form of
everything from “informed judgement” to elaborate
econometric models. Another means of obtaining an
estimate of the level of short-tenn interest rates ex-
pected to prevail at some future date has become
available since early 1976. This method employs the
yield quotations of the futures market in U.S. Treas-
ury bills. These quotations, which are available on a
daily basis, embody market expectations of future
short-term interest rates. This paper focuses on the
information about market expectations which can
be obtained from yields on Treasury bill futures
contracts.
THE ROLE OF THE
TREASURY BILL FUTURES MARKET
The futures market in three-month U.S. Treasury
bills was opened on the International Monetary Mar-
ket of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in January
1976, soon after the opening of a mortgage futures
market on the Chicago Board of Trade in October
1975.’ Both of these futures markets in financial in-
struments operate in essentially the same way as the
traditional commodity futures markets. Futures trad-
ing in financial instruments allows the separation of
the risk of unexpected interest rate movements from
other types of risk. Futures contracts can he used to
hedge against interest rate movements in order to
protect actual or expected cash positions of market
participants. Profits are thereby protected in much
the same way as hedging in commodity futures mar-
kets protects against price fluctuations of a particular
commodity. Speculation is facilitated by the existence
of futures markets, which allow the assumption of
‘For details on the Treasury bill futures market, see the ac-
companying section: “Characteristics of the Treasury Bill
Futures Market.”
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interest-rate risk by individuals willing to bear such
risk in return for the possibility of making a profit.2
Futures Markets, Information, and Market
Expectations
Trading in futures markets provides information
to the cash market about the commodity being
traded.3 Prices of futures contracts for delivery of a
2
For a discussion of the futures markets and the roles of hedg-
ing and speculation, see Thomas A, Hieronymus, Economics
of Futures Trading: For Commercial and Personal Profit, 2nd
ed. (New York: Commodity Research Bureau, Inc., 1977).
Uses of the Treasury bill futures market in tenns of hedg-
ing and speculation are basically the same as those of the
mortgage futures market, In addition, a discussion of the
costs and benefits of the Treasury bill futures market would
be essentially the same as a discussion of the costs and bene-
fits of the mortgage futures market, For such analyses of the
mortgage futures market, see Neil A. Stevens, “A Mortgage
Futures Market: Its Development, Uses, Benefits, and Costs,”
this Review (April 1976), pp. 12-19.
a discussion of the effect of futures trading on infonnation
in spot markets, see Chades C, Cox, “Futures Tradiog and
Market Information,” Journal of Political Economy (Deccm-
her 1976), pp. 1215-37.
commodity at a future date provide market partici-
pants with information as to the expected pattern of
future spot prices of this commodity. This is because
information relating to the future state of the market
for a particular commodity is utilized by market par-
ticipants when determining the price at which they
are willing to buy or sell futures contracts,
If a trader projects that a commodity’s price will
be different in the future than at the present time,
he will buy or sell contracts for delivery of the com-
modity at some future date as if his projection were
correct. Any trader who has better information about
future spot prices than other market participants (or
feels that he does) can attempt to make profits by
trading on this information, with the result that such
information is quickly incorporated into the prices of
futures contracts. Thus, the interaction of all traders
in the futures market provides price quotations which
embody the market’s expectations of the future spot
prices that will prevail on various delivery dates.
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In the case of the futures market in Treasury bills,
the yields on futures contracts indicate the pattern of
interest rates expected by market participants to pre-
vail in certain months in the future, given currently
available information. Any expectation of future in-
terest rates, however arrived at, utilizes information
about the current and expected values of variables
that are thought to influence the behavior of interest
rates. Such variables include measures of the current
and future state of the economy, the supply and de-
mand for credit, and the course of monetary and
fiscal policy. The futures market in Treasury bills
serves the role of a processor of this information. As
new information about the course of key factors
influencing interest rates becomes available, it is
rapidly reflected in futures market prices.’
The expected interest rate for any date in the
future which is embodied in the yield on current
futures contracts is not necessarily the interest rate
that will prevail at that future date, Market partici-
pants in the futures market do not have a crystal
ball that foretells the future perfectly. Their decisions
to buy or sell contracts are based on the information
available at the present time. As new information be-
comes available, market participants may vemy well
revise their expectations. The effect of new informa-
tion — such as a change in the announced monetary
targets, new budget projections, revised projections
of the strength of economic activity, new pricing
policies by OPEC, and so on is reflected in changes
in the prices of (and yields on) futures contracts.
Consequently, changes in market expectations can be
identified by shifts in the pattern of yields on futures
contracts (futures rates). Sharp declines or increases
in futures rates can be identified as changes in the ex-
pected level of future interest rates, Thus, a compari-
son of the quotations on futures contracts at two dif-
ferent points in time provides information on whether
4
This discussion does not imply that the Treasury bill futures
market satisfies the “efficient market” hypothesis. In an “effi-
cient market”, all available information is utilized immediately
by traders (and potential traders ), new ioformation is ax-au—
able to everyone at the same time, and new infonnation is
immediately incorporated into market prices and yields. The
discussion in the paper implies only that some of the avail-
able infor atioo is utilized by traders (or potential traders) -
and that nesv intonnatiou which is utilized is quickly reflected
in futures prices. This allows for information costs andimperfect
information among market participants. For a general discus-
sion of the “efficient market” model, see Oldrich A. Vasicek
and John A. McQuown, “The Efficient Market Model,” Fi-
nancial Analysts Journal (September - October 1972), pp. 71-
84. For a theoretical treatment, see Eugene F. Fama, “Effi-
cient Capital Markets: A Review of Theorx- and Empirical
Work,” Journal of Finance (May 1970), pp. 383-417; or
Richard Roll, The Behaeior of Interest Rates: An Application
of the Efficient Market Model to US. Treasury Bills (New
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970).
market expectations have changed with regard to the
future level of short-term rates. One implication of
this is that it may be possible to assess the effect of
a change in monetary or fiscal policy on market
expectations of future short-term interest rates,
Futures Rates and Expected Spot Rates
One way of looking at the price and yield quota-
tions on Treasury bill futures contracts in Table I
is to interpret the yields on each futures contract as
a market estimate of the three-month Treasury bill
rate that is currently expected to prevail in each
delivery month. Thus, the market’s expectation on
March 14, 1977, svas that the three-mnonth bill rate
would be 5,23 percent in June of this year, and would
increase another 126 basis points by December to 6.49
percent. In comparison, the three-month bill rate on
March 14, 1977, for currently traded three-month
bills, was about 4.57 percent.
However, such use of the Treasury bill futures
rates is subject to some reservations. The main ques-
tion is whether the futures rates are unbiased esti-
mates of the market’s expectations of future interest
rates. According to the “nornial backwardation”
argument of Keynes and I-licks, futures prices are
downward-biased estimates of expected future spot
prices.5 This implies that even if future spot prices
are expected to remain the same as the current spot
price, the futures price will be below the expected
spot price by an amount equal to a risk premium.
This premium is considered to he a return to specu-
lators for assuming the risk of possible future price
fluctuations, and is larger for delivery dates which
extend further into the future, This implies, in turn,
that the price of the futures contract will tend to
rise (the yield will fall) as the delivery date ap-
proaches, provided there is no change in market
expectations,
In terms of futures markets in Treasury bills, the
theory of “normal backwardation” implies that yields
on futures contracts are upward-biased estimates of
expected future interest rates (since prices and yields
of securities are inversely related). Accordingly, the
interest rate on three-month Treasury bills expected
to prevail as of some future delivery date is less than
the yield quoted on the futures contract for that
5
Johu Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Money: The Applied
Theory of Money, vol. II (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1930), pp. 142-47; and J. R. Hicks, Value and
Capital: An Inquiry ivito Some Fundamental Principles of
Economic Theory, 2nd erl. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946),
pp. 136-39.
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delivery date.°In addition, if yields on futures con-
tracts are higher for later delivery dates than for
earlier delivery dates, it is not certain that the ex-
pected future spot rate is higher for the later deliv-
ery dates than for the earlier delivery dates. This is
because a larger risk premium is included in the
yield associated with the later delivery dates. Only if
the difference between the yields for an earlier and
later delivery date exceed the difference between
their risk premia can one conclude that the expected
future spot rate is higher for the later delivery date.
One implication of this line of reasoning is that
gradual declines in futures rates cannot necessarily
be identified as declines in market expectations of
future spot rates, since the yields on futures contracts
tend to fall as the delivery date approaches. How-
ever, sharp declines indicate a change in expectations,
as do increases in futures rates, provided the risk
premia are constant or change very little (which is
generally assumed by the theory).
If these risk premia could be easily estimated,
market expectations of future interest rates could be
estimated from quotations on futures contracts. Unfor-
tunately, this is not the case. In addition, other ana-
lysts dispute the “normal backwardation” argument
and claim that futures prices are unbiased estimates
of expected future spot prices.7 The issues surround-
ing this question of unbiasedness are not within the
scope of this paper, but some observations on the
matter can be made.
Even if futures rates are biased estimates of mar-
ket expectations, the bias will not be very large,
judging from the estimates of risk premia embodied
in the yield curve.8 Furthermore, the bias, if it exists,
is expected by most theorists to be consistent over
time, rather than being subject to large fluctuations.
Consequently, even though futures rates may not be
entirely accurate as point estimates of market expec-
tations, it may be possible to make rough estimates
of expected future interest rates.
Table I
FUTURES PRICES FOR U.S. TREASURY BILLS ON MARCH 14, 1977
Delivery Price Yiold~ Yield
Month - Open High Low Closo~ Change IDiscount’ O,anqr 7
Mo’cti 1977 95.37 95.40 95.37 93.39 H .01 4.61 .0!
June 1977 94.73 94.84 94.71 94.11 .03 5.23 .03
September 1Q77 94.10 94.16 94.05 94.10 - .0! 5.90 .01
December 1977 93.52 93.56 93.46 93-3! -i- .01 6.49 .01
Mardi 1978 9303 93.17 93.04 93.13 H .08 681 08
June 1978 92.66 92.75 92.66 92.66 - 734
I in—h :1 t’,-n.,-n i-i iii--
—B, - sh-,_-~,,’i.-:—,-lti-.’,mi’-. 1-:-’:,- I ‘u-lu .o i’vrh_ -
- liLt ‘ I-~’i~
11
F. MPL!I 1. 1-;:
Trading Volume
Another issue bearing on the usefulness of the
futures rates involves the amount of trading which
occurs in each contract. Generally, it is thought that
the larger the amount of trading in a security, the
more representative the price and yield quotations
OHicks used the “nominal backwardation” argument of the
futures market in his development of the liquidity preference
theory of the term structure of interest rates. See Hicks,
Value and Capital, Chapters XI and XIII. In the literature
on the term structure, market expectations of future interest
rates have been examined using the implied forward rates
which are embodied in the yield curve. These implied for-
ward rates are theoretically equivalent to futures rates.
t
For discussions of the issues involved and some empirical
evidence in support of nos-mal hackwardation, see Hendrik S.
Houthakker, “Normal Backwardatinn,” in Value, Capftal, and
Growth: Papers in Honour of Sir John Hicks, ed. James N.
Wolfe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1958), Chap-
ter 7, and “Can Speculators Forecast Prices?” The Review of
Economics and Statistics (May 1957), pp. 143-51. For evi-
dence against the theory of normal backwardation, see Lester
C. Telser, “Futures Trading and the Storage of Cotton and
Wheat,” Journal of Political Economy (June 1958), pp. 233-
55. Telser argues that prices of futures contracts are solely
market expectations of future spot rates and contain no risk
premia.-
5
Since such premia in the Treasury bill futures market will be,
at most, for three-month bills eighteen months in the future,
the bias in the yields on futures contracts will not be very
large. This is due to the fact that the premia, according to
the liquidity preference theory, increase with term-to-maturity
for such Treasury bills. TIms, the premia associated with
three-month bills to be issued six months frosn today are
expected to be smaller than the premia associated with three-
snonth bills to be issued one year from today. Estimates of
these presnia have generally been less than 50 basis points.
See J. Huston McCulloch, “An Estimate of the Liquidity
Premium,” Journal of Political Economy (February 1975),
pp. 95-119; Roll, The Behavior of Interest Rates, pp. 98-99;
and Edxvard J. Kane and Burton C. Malkiel, “The Term
Structure of Interest Rates An Analysis of a Survey of In-
terest-Rate Expectations,” The Review of Economics and Sta-
tistics (Amsgust 1967), pp. 345-55.
The existence of a bias in the futures rates can be tested
by investigating whether, with constant expectations, the
prices of futures contracts rise (yields fall) as the delivery
date approaches.
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ToMe II
AVERAGE DAILY TRADING VOLUME BY MONTH
Cantresct Do ivery Month
Tolol
Mont Mar I, June Sept nbc Dec mber March June Septers,be December Mar h Jun S prenber Al
Traded 1974 1976 976 1976 1977 1977 1977 977 1978 1978 1978 llssu I
January 5976 52895 3475’ SI! 8 18872
Febrea 1976 5889 .63 27 4 1271 134.86
MacIs 1976 2746 19239 75 7 298 784 3869
Art 1976 4176 12043 3900 500 30619
Ma 1976 9200 2445 8460 1737 758 426,00
one 1976 2647 23014 7 5 2736 5045 38197
ely 1976 24243 25857 43.0 843 775 605 7624
Au~u,t1976 6073 2350 6944 1150 23 241 41909
Septensbe 1976 1967 85.43 10762 39,8! 4.00 3.10 200 36! 62
October 1976 15971 290.71 16057 27.71 15.19 429 61819
November 1974 5 30 34565 31540 6775 2035 255 8 1.00
December 1976 3 88 23 43 29481 12295 3690 1767 74064
January 1977 21667 39848 30133 7471 3514 386 103019
February 1977 79 32 415 05 24226 88.0 17 2 8 76 8 0.56
Mar Is 1927 3 .59 350.91 38504 7409 074 27.13 27.67 105317
April 1977 2 65 51 45 523 25 72 0 75.7 4 85 156 .05
So ce I matson Maneta Market DivI ,s o (Ibsen a Mere a le Each n
will be of the market value of the securityY In the
case of Treasury bill futures contracts, this suggests
that contracts with low trading volume are not rep-
resentative of the market value of these contracts,
and, hence, are not representative of market expecta-
tions. However, the issue is more complicated than
this.
As can be seen from Table II, trading in any par-
ticular futures contract is low when it is first traded,
increases over time, but then is again low as its
delivery date approaches. For example, trading in the
futures contract for delivery in March 1977 can be
examined by reading down the appropriate column
in Table II. This issue was first traded in March
1976, and the average daily volume of trading was
only 7.84 contracts. By November 1976, trading in-
creased to over 345 contracts per day. But after
January 1977, with less than two months to the
delivery date, trading declined below 100 contracts
per day.
As the delivery date approaches, trading volume
generally declines because there is greater certainty
as to what the spot rate will be on the delivery date.
That is, traders tend to agree as to the future market
value of three-month Treasury bills (their expecta-
tions become homogeneous) when the delivery date
is near. Consequently, there is less risk of interest
rate fluctuations to be hedged against and less likeli-
hood that profits can be made from trading, so that
less trading occurs. In this case, the futures rates do
9
This line of reasoning underlies, in part, the construction of
the Treasury Department’s yield curves, which give greater
weight to the yields of some actively traded issues.
reflect the market valuation of the contracts, even
though there is little trading.
However, a lack of trading may also he indicative
of a case where market participants have ill-defined
expectations of future interest rates and their expec-
tations are so diffuse that traders’ bid or asked
prices are not matched up with each other. In this
case, there is little trading because there is great
uncertainty as to the range in which the future spot
rate will fall. It is possible that this case applies to
the futures rates associated with contracts for deliv-
ery in fifteen to eighteen months, such as the March
1978 contract which was first traded in September
1976 (Table II).
On the other hand, when market participants have
well-defined but heterogeneous expectations of future
spot rates, trading activity is likely to be large. In this
case, traders tend to agree as to the range in which
the future spot rate will fall, but disagree as to the
exact value. Market participants perceive that there
is greater risk of interest rate fluctuations to be hedged
against, and that profits can be made from trading.
Bid and asked prices on contracts for the delivery
date match up over a larger number of traders, and
trading volume is larger.
Therefore, the extent to which the yields on futures
contracts for particular delivery dates accurately reflect
the market value of these contracts, and market expec-
tations of future interest rates, depends upon the
distribution of the expectations of traders. It is not
simply a matter of the amount of trading in each
contract.
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The volume of trading also reflects on the Treasury
bill futures market as a whole. The volume of trading
in futures contracts compares quite favorably with
the volume of trading in the spot market for Treasury
bills. The total volume of trading in the Treasury bill
futures market was relatively light during the first
two months of trading after its opening on January
6, 1976. But beginning in March 1976, trading in-
creased substantially to an average daily volume of
about 318 contracts (Table II). With each contract
representing $1 million of three-month bills, this
trading represented the daily exchange of $318 mil-
lion of Treasury securities in the futures market. In
contrast, the average daily volume of trading by se-
curities dealers in the spot market for all outstanding
Treasury bills (approximately forty different issues)
was $8.76 billion during March 1976. These figures
average out to a daily volume of roughly $64 million
for each Treasury bill futures market issue (five
issues were traded in March 1976), compared to
about $169 million for each outstanding Treasury bill




The pattern of yields on Treasury bill futures con-
tracts since the initiation of trading on the Interna-
tional Monetary Market is shown on a daily basis
in Chart I. Examining the snovement of these yields
provides some insight into the adjustment of market
expectations of future short-term interest rates to new
information about the state of the economy and the
future supply of and demand for credit. The chart
shows that the yields on all of the futures contracts
being traded during any particular time period follow
the same pattern of movement to a remarkable
degree.
During the first quarter of 1976, market expecta-
tions of the future level of the three-month Treasury
bill rate increased as the economy experienced a 9.2
percent annual rate of growth in Real Cross National
Product (GNP). With the economy growing at such
a rapid pace, market participants apparently antici-
pated a continuation of this upswing in economic
activity during the remainder of the year, although
not at so fast a pace. This expected strength in eco-
nomic activity was translated into anticipations of
increased demands for short-term credit, with a cont
sequent rise in interest rates. During March 1976, the
yield on the September 1976 futures contract was
generally above 8.50 percent, while the currently
traded three-month Treasury bill yielded about 5
percent.
The yields on futures contracts declined during
April 1976, but by May yields had returned to roughly
the same levels as were recorded in March (Chart
I). During most of April 1976, newly available data
indicated moderating pressures on the credit market
and expectations of future levels of interest rates were
revised downward. For example, the yields on the
September 1976 futures contract during April were
close to 6 percent, down from about 8.5 percent in
March. Data on the money stock (Ml) that became
available in the first half of April showed that the
money stock had grown at a 2.9 percent rate over
the first quarter of 1976, well below the FOMC’s an-
nounced target ranges for Ml growth.’°Most market
participants apparently did not anticipate any near-
tenn tightening in monetary policy actions, and
viewed the gro\vth of money as being consistent with
a continued gradual reduction of the longer-run infla-
tionary impact of policy actions. The preliminary
GNP data available in mid-April continued to show a
slowing in inflation and a strong surge in real output
growth. Business loan demand at commercial banks
remained weak and Treasury financing requirements
were running well below earlier estimates.
Beginning in late April 1976, however, there were
several developments that acted to change market
expectations. On April 22, market participants became
aware that there had been a very sharp surge in Ml
in early April (money stock data is reported with a
one-week lag). Data available in May indicated
that the money stock was rising very rapidly, ex-
panding at nearly a 17 percent annual rate in April
and then at a 5.7 percent rate in May. On May 3 it
was announced that the FOMC had voted at its April
meeting to lower the upper hand on the long-run
growth of Ml from 7½ to 7 percent.11 The Federal
Reserve moved to a more restrictive policy, and this
was made apparent to market participants by a steady
rise in the Federal funds rate from about 4.78 per-
cent in the week ended April 23 to 5.02 percent in
the week ended May 14. Then, at its May 18 meet-
ing, the FOMC voted to adopt a Federal funds range
of 5 - 5% percent, compared to a 4½ - 5¼ percent
range at the April meeting. By the week ended May
28, the Federal funds rate had risen to an average of
lOAlbert E. Burger and Douglas H. Mudd, “The FOMC in
1976: Progress Against Inflation,” this Review (March 1977),
pp. 2-17.
IlIbid. Rates of growth of the snoney stock used in this paper
are the originally reported figures, not the subsequently re-
viserl figures.
Page 70o
Yields on Treasury Bill Futures Contracts~k














1/6/76 1/29/76 2/24/76 3/18/76 4/12/76 5/6/76 6/1/76 6/24/76 7/20/76 8/12/76 9/7/76 9/30/76 10/25/76 11/18/76 12/14/76 1/10/77 2/2/77 2/28/77 3/23/77 4/18/71
LL All yield s ,,,,o,c,di,cou, basis.










1911FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JUNE 1977
5,50 percent. As this new information about the
course of monetary developments became available,
market anticipations of future levels of interest rates
returned by late May to about the same level as was
recorded in March 1976.
The expected increase in credit demand failed to
appear, GNP growth remained moderate, the inflation
rate declined, and the unemployment rate increased
during the summer of 1976. Growth of the money
stock fell to about a 3 percent rate from May to
September. Yields on futures contracts and the spot
rate on three-month bills both declined slowly from
late May until early October,’2 when the yields on
futures contracts fell quite sharply. This sharp decline
was reversed in late October when yields increased
almost to their early September levels. This reversal
in expected yields was also associated with incoming
monetary data that indicated a sharp surge in the
rate of growth of the money stock. From September
to October, Ml increased at a 15.5 percent annual
rate.
Indicators of the strength of economic activity con-
tinued to decline during the last quarter of 1976, as
did the rate of inflation, and market interest rates on
all types of securities continued to decline. In the last
half of November, market expectations of future
interest rates declined sharply. After the surge in
Ml growth during October, the money stock was
little changed during November. But the Federal
funds rate declined from about 5 percent in early
November to about 4.75 percent in early December,
which, in turn, was interpreted by market partici-
pants as indicating that the Federal Reserve had
adopted a somewhat less restrictive policy. During
November, yields on futures contracts fell 50 basis
points or more. With pessimism about the “pause” in
the economy mounting, yields on futures contracts
for Treasury bills continued to fluctuate around these
lower levels until the end of the year.
The increase in expected future interest rates in
early January 1977 coincided with the new Adminis-
tration’s announcement of a stimulative fiscal pack-
age. At the same tUne, data on the economic indi-
cators for November were revised upward and a
strong showing of some of the indicators for Decem-
ber was reported. Furthermore, monetary actions were
no longer moving toward a further reduction in the
12
Under the “normal backwardation” hypothesis, this gradual
decline in futures rates may not reflect a gradual decline in
market expectations of future spot rates. Instead, such a
gradual decline over lime is consistent with constant market
expectations of future spot rates, since if “normal backwarda-
tion” holds, futures mates tend to fall (futures prices rise
as the contract delivery date approaches.
Federal funds rate, contrary to the initial expectations
of many market analysts. As a result, yields on futures
contracts increased to their levels of mid-October
through early November.
From early January through March 1977, yields on
futures contracts were relatively stable. During April,
when the Administration’s rebate program was can-
celled and the energy program was announced, fu-
tures rates fluctuated sharply. As new information on
the state of the economy and on future supplies and
demands for credit becomes available to market par-
ticipants, the expected future interest rates that are
embodied in the yields on future contracts for U.S.
Treasury bills will be revised, Movements in the levels
of these yields will, therefore, provide a significant
indicator of revisions of market expectations of future
short-term interest rates.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Treasury bill futures market provides a means
for hedging against interest-rate risk. Speculators are
allowed the opportunity of making profits in this
market in return for bearing the risk of future interest
rate fluctuations. In addition, futures markets provide
information about the expected future pattern of
prices. In doing so, indications of changes in market
expectations of future short-term interest rates can be
obtained. Although exact estimates of the expected
level of future spot rates may not be obtainable from
futures rates without adjusting for a risk premium, an
approximation of the level is possible.
If it can be shown that futures rates are unbiased
estimates of expected future interest rates, the data
from the Treasury bill futures market could be very
useful in a number of ways. Policymakers would be
able to readily assess the effects of policy changes on
market expectations of future interest rates. Econ-
omists and other researchers would have observable
values for market expectations of interest rates, in-
stead of having to use proxy variables for such ex-
pected rates. Analyses of the portfolio behavior of
financial intermediaries, investment decisions of firms,
and the term structure of interest rates are among
the many areas of research which would be aided by
the use of such data. In addition, analysts who fore-
cast interest rates would be able to compare their
estimates of future interest rates against the market’s
expectations. Since market expectations of interest
rates are an important factor in many economic rela-
tionships, the information on expectations contained
in the Treasury bill futures market will be of increas-
ing interest to businessmen, financial managers, pol-
icymakers, and other economic analysts.
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